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LEGAL, MORAL & INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD: THE CALL FOR A
UNIFORM REGULATORY SCHEME IN
THE UNITED STATES
Lisa L. Behm"

INTRODUCTION
An estimated two to three million couples in the United States suffer from
infertility.1 Until recently, infertile couples had only two options: adopt
a child or remain childless. 2 However, with the advent of new
reproductive technologies, infertile couples now have the advantage of
selecting from a number of options, including artificial insemination,
donor egg transplantation, and surrogacy. Of these new technologies,
surrogacy is arguably the most controversial. 3 Nevertheless, within the
past fifteen years, the practice of surrogacy has gained respect as an
attractive reproductive alternative for infertile couples who wish to
conceive a child biologically related to at least one of them.4
Surrogacy is defined as an "[a]greement wherein a woman agrees to
be artificially inseminated with the semen of another woman's husband;
she is to conceive a child, carry the child to term and after the birth, assign
her parental rights to the birth father and his wife."'5 This definition,
however, refers only to one of two forms of surrogacy arrangements,

"B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994; J.D. (Cum Laude) Marquette Univertsit,

Law School, 1998; LL.M. (Cand.), Georgetown University Law Center, 1999.
'See HELENARAGONE, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION INTHE HEART 13 ( 1994).
1d.
31d.
4Id.
SBLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1445 (6's ed. 1990).
2
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namely, artificial insemination surrogacy (also known as traditional
surrogacy).6
The other form of surrogacy arrangement is in vitro fertilization
surrogacy (also known as gestational surrogacy).7 In this procedure, an
embryo is created in a petri dish with the egg of the intended mother and
the sperm of the intended father.8 The embryo is then transferred to the
designated gestational surrogate, who carries it to term.9 Unlike a child
conceived by a traditional surrogacy arrangement, children born of
gestational surrogacy arrangement are genetically related to both of their
intended parents.'0
While the prevalence ofsurrogacy has grown, the debate surrounding
it has grown concurrently. Surrogacy has raised a number of legal, moral,
and ethical issues and controversies that have yet to be resolved by courts
and legislatures. The most commonly raised issues include the contractual
aspects of surrogacy, the assignment of parental rights, and the
commercial aspect of paying money to the surrogate for her "services."'"
This article examines a number of the issues and controversies
discusses the evolution of surrogacy
surrounding surrogacy. The first part
2
from Biblical times to the present.'1
The next section addresses the legal debate over surrogacy that has
grown out of this evolution. 3 First, it discusses the constitutional basis
for surrogacy and the constitutional issues that have arisen therein. 4 Then
it reviews the surrogacy case law, focusing on the landmark cases ofIn re
BabyM 5 andJohnsonv. Calvert,6 emphasizing the difficulty encountered
surrogacy-related disputes in the absence
by the judiciary in adjudicating
7
of legislative guidance.'

6OPTSInformationalNewsletter (Organization of Parents Through Surrogacy, Wheeling,
I11.)
Jan.1996 (OPTS is a non-profit organization of parents whose children were born through
assisted reproduction).
7Id.

8Id.
9

1d.

1ld.
"Id.
2See infra pp. 570-573.
3See infra pp. 573-587.
4See infra pp. 573-576.
'5537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
16851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
"See infra pp. 576-587.
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Various issues raised by surrogacy from a feminist perspective are

then examined.18 A discussion of feminist views on the issue ofsurrogacy
is useful in conveying the impassioned arguments both for and against
surrogacy and other new forms of reproduction.
The next section discusses the legislative response to surrogacy on
both the state and federal levels in an attempt to emphasize the lack of
legislative uniformity and guidance with respect to the issues surrounding
surrogacy. 9 In the absence of comprehensive federal legislation
regulating surrogacy in the United States, 2the Canadian legislative
response to surrogacy is examined for insight.
Finally, this article proposes that Congress pass uniform legislation
to regulate surrogacy in the United States.2 Such legislation is necessary
in order to respect procreative liberty, protect parties to surrogacy
arrangements from the possibility of exploitation, and to effectively guide
the courts in adjudicating surrogacy-related disputes. This Part contends
that the focus of such legislation should be on the regulation, not the
prohibition, of surrogacy. It refutes the arguments for the prohibition of
surrogacy, including the argument that surrogacy exploits and
commodifies women and children. Surrogacy should be protected as a
viable reproductive method by which an infertile couple may conceive a
child who will ultimately benefit from their love and nurturing.
Additionally, women who wish to become surrogates should have the
right to do so under their freedom to contract.
In conclusion, a comprehensive regulatory scheme for legislating
surrogacy is needed. This article argues that proposed regulations would
effectively address the concerns raised by surrogacy while ensuring the
right of infertile couples to pro create pursuant to a surrogacy arrangement.

'8See infra pp. 587-591.
19See infra pp. 591-595.
2°See
infra pp. 595-603.
2
1See infra pp. 603-609.
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THE EVOLUTION OF SURROGACY
The History of Surrogacy
Although most of the controversy surrounding surrogacy has arisen only
recently, the concept of surrogacy can be traced back to Biblical times.2"
According to the Old Testament, Abraham's "barren" wife Sarah
persuaded Abraham to have intercourse with her maid Hagar so "she may
have a child by her."23 Hagar then conceived and gave birth to Ishmael,
whom Sarah and Abraham raised as their own son.24 Obviously, in those
days there were no "surrogacy contracts" nor any notion that the bearer of
the child should be paid a fee for carrying the child.25 Furthermore, it was
never disputed that the bearer of the child would relinquish her parental
rights upon the birth of the child.26
As society and reproductive technology advanced, the concept of
surrogacy became more widely recognized. With the creation of
procedures such as artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization,
surrogacy became a viable alternative means of reproduction for infertile
couples.27 Before surrogacy became the center of the current legal debate,
many informal surrogacy arrangements existed, in which a woman,
usually a friend or relative of the infertile couple, would carry and deliver
a child for an infertile couple for purely charitable reasons.28 In these
arrangements, surrogates were rarely screened, and a requirement that the
parties sign a contract usually was not present.29 Furthermore, in response
to concerns about violating "baby selling" statutes, which were enacted to
regulate black market adoptions, surrogates were almost never paid a fee.3

"See Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy:A Last Resort Alternativefor Infertile Women or a
Commodificationof Women 'sBodiesand Children?, 12 Wis. WOMEN's L.J. 113, 116-17 (1997).
"Genesis
16:1-2.
24
1d"
"See JULIA J. TATE, SURROGACY: WHAT PROGRESS SINCE HAGAR, BILHAIt, AND ZILPAIII
1(1994).

26Id. The fact that Hagar was Sarah's "maid" may further the notion that surrogacy is a form
of slavery. For a discussion of surrogacy as a form of slavery, see Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy,
Slavery, andthe Ownership ofLife, 13 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 139 (1990).
27See Kerian, note 22, at 117.
2See SUSAN L. COOPER & ELLEN S. GLAZER, BEYOND INFERTILITY 261 (1994).

"See id.
"These statutes were enacted to prosecute "baby brokers," who financially induced young,

unwed pregnant women to give up their children after birth and then sold the babies to adoptive
parents for a profit. See John D. Ingram, Surrogate Gestator:A New and HonorableProfession,
76 MARQ. L. REV. 675, 681-82 (1993).
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The Development of Modern
Surrogacy Arrangements
The precedent for modem surrogacy arrangements was set in California
in the mid-1970s.3 ' At this time, a couple placed an anonymous
advertisement in a local paper in order to find a woman to bear a child for
them through artificial insemination.32 When a woman answered the
advertisement and agreed to become the surrogate, the couple's attorney
drafted a contract in which the couple agreed to pay the surrogate S7,000
for her "services" and $3,000 in medical and legal expenses.33 The
pregnancy that resulted from this agreement produced a baby girl. 34
When the couple's story appeared in the DetroitFreePress,another
infertile couple approached Noel Keane, the "father of surrogate
motherhood," 35 in Michigan and requested he help them find a woman
who would bear a child for them.36 Although Keane was hesitant to enter
into such an uncharted area of the law, he construed the aforementioned
California arrangement
as precedent and decided to help this couple and
37
two others.

In order to determine the parameters of the relevant law in Michigan,
Keane wrote letters to the State Attorney General, a judge, and a
physician. 31 Only the judge replied. 39 The judge opined that, under
Michigan law, the impregnation ofwomen through artificial insemination
was wholly acceptable and that the payment of medical and legal fees was
equally legitimate. 4' Nevertheless, the judge reasoned that the intended
parents of the child could not legally pay a surrogate a fee to carry the
child orto relinquish the child for adoption. Under these circumstances,
Keane encountered great difficulty in finding surrogates for the three
couples because, according to state law, these surrogates would not be
compensated for undergoing artificial insemination, carrying a baby for

3'See NOEL P. KEANE & DENNIS L. BREo, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 33-35 (1931).
32See id.
at 33.
"See id.
34
See id.
3See Lori B. ANDREWS, BETWEEN STRANGERS: SURROGATE MOTHERS, ExpECmNT
FATHERS, & BRAVE NEWv BABIES 16 (1989).
36See KEANE & BREO, supra note 3 1, at 27-30.
37See KEANE & BREO, supra note 3 1, at 46-48.
"'See KEANE & BREO, supra note 31, at 46-48.
39See KEANE & BREO, supra note 31, at 46-48.
40
See KEANE & BREO, supra note 31, at 46-48.
4
QSee KEANE & BEO, supra note 3 1, at 46.48.
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nine months, and releasing the child upon birth.42 In 1978, after appealing
to the public's sense of altruism by publicizing the plight of these
couples, 43 Keane was finally successful in attracting surrogates for all of
the couples, each of whom had babies through surrogacy arrangements."
Despite these success stories, Keane's primary objective was to arrange
for the legal payment of fees to surrogate mothers. 45 To this end, he
attempted to determine a method by which to circumvent the Michigan
adoption statutes, which prohibited payment of money to a mother for
relinquishing her rights to her child.4 6 Thus, in representing an infertile
couple in Doe v. Kelley,47 Keane unsuccessfully challenged these laws.48
In this case, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that, even though a
couple might legally use a surrogate to conceive a child, any payment
made to the surrogate in exchange for the release of her parental rights to
the child was illegal under state law.49
Frustrated by Michigan's hard-line rejection of compensation for
surrogates, Keane decided to work with a clinic in Kentucky, where the
payment to a woman for the relinquishment of her parental rights to a
child had not been prohibited. 50 As part of his work, Keane sent Michigan
couples to Kentucky, where they established residency, completed
adoption proceedings, and paid the surrogate mother $10,000 for her
"services.""1 These procedures made Keane's practice of arranging
surrogacy agreements highly successful, 2 and helped popularize
surrogacy as a viable solution to infertility. 3
In the 1980s, surrogacy became a prominent practice in California
and many other states.54 In addition to its newfound popularity, the
technological aspect of surrogacy expanded with the success of the first

42

See ANDREWS, supra note 35, at 17.

43

See ANDREWS, supra note 35, at 28 (discussing how Keane took the couples on local talk

shows).
"See KEANE & BREO, supra note 3 1, at 95, 115.
4
SSee KEANE & BREO, supra note 31, at 116.
46See KEANE & BREO, supra note 31, at 116.
47
Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. App. 1981).
4
91d.
49Id
50

See ANDREWS, supra note 35, at 28-29.
S"See
KEANE & BREo, supra note 31, at 186, 210.
52
See Kerian, supra note 22, at 119.
s3See Kerian, supra note 22, at 119.
54
See Kerian, supra note 22, at 119.
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gestational surrogacy arrangement in 1986.5 By the mid-1980's, however,
the growth and success of surrogacy arrangements was thwarted by legal
battles and controversies. 6
THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER SURROGACY
As surrogacy became more prevalent, it engendered a host of legal issues
and conflicts. These conflicts have at times erupted into a fierce debate
over the legality of surrogacy. A discussion of this debate is necessary in
order to understand the arguments underlying surrogacy. Furthermore,
sincethe controversy surrounding surrogacy, as establishedby the leading
surrogacy cases and arguments made by legal scholars and commentators,
has shaped society's attitudes toward surrogacy, such a discussion is
important in determining how surrogacy should be dealt with in the
future.

57

The Constitutional Issues
Surrounding Surrogacy
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
surrogacy, it has recognized an individual's right to be free from
government intrusion in matters relating to marriage, procreation, and
child-rearing. 5 In Grisw'oldv. Connecticut,59 the Court found the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the penumbral rights in the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights
encompassed a right to privacy. 60 Thus, the Court invalidated a
Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married
couples under the reasoning that the marital relationship falls within this
"zone of privacy" and should, therefore, be free from government
intrusion.6

"5See Jamie Levitt, Biology, Technology and Genealogy A Proposed Uniform Surrogacy
Legislation,25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451,455 (1992).
SSee Kerian,supra note 22, at 119.

s'See Kerian, supra note 22, at 119-20.
"See Kerian, supra note 22, at 119-20.

'1381 U.S. 479 (1965).
60

1d. at 484-86.

'Id. at 484-86.
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InEisenstadtv. Baird,62 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to single individuals, and
extended the protection of the "zone of privacy" to the decision of every
individual, married or single, whether to bear a child. 6' The Court
emphasized the fundamental right ofthe individual to privacy, stating "[i]f
the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child." 64 In the landmark case ofRoe v. Wade,65 the Court
reasoned that since the right to procreate is constitutionally protected, the
converse of this right is also protected.66 Thus, privacy and autonomy
include the right to obtain an abortion. 67
The fundamental right of privacy in matters of procreation gained
further momentum in Stanley v. Illinois.68 In this case, the Court held that
in the absence of a compelling state interest to the contrary, parents have
a fundamental right to raise and beget children without government
interference.6 In doing so, the Court deemed the rights to conceive and
raise children to be "essential," "basic civil rights" that are "far more
precious than property rights." 70
Differing Views on the Relationship
Between Procreative Liberty
and Surrogacy
Proponents of surrogacy contend that "if the right to procreate through
traditional, coital method is a protected right, then procreation through
71
surrogacy or othermedically available options should also be protected.,
These proponents argue that the "liberty interests protected by the
Constitution do not change definition because of the presence or absence

62405

U.S. 438 (1972).

6

Ad. at 453.
'Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).

65410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"Id. at 152-153.
67
1d. at 153.
63405 U.S. 645 (1972).
69
Id. at 648.
70
1d. at 65 1.
71
See Eric A. Gordon, TheAftermath ofJohnson v. Calvert: SurrogacyLawReflecsa More
Liberal View ofReproductive Technology, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 191, 200 (1993).

1999]

SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: UNIFORMREGULATORYSCHEME

565

of reproductive technology." 72 Moreover, they view surrogacy as a form
of conception that is equally legitimate to the traditional form because it
is "arguably no more 'artificial' than the contraceptive devices to which
the Supreme Court recognized a right of access in Griswold and
Eisenstadt." 73 Thus, under the Due Process Clause, the fundamental right
to "bear or beget a child" includes "access to any means ofprocreation."74
Proponents further argue that under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the recognition of artificial insemination
through donor sperm as a means of dealing with male infertility
necessitates the recognition of surrogacy as a remedy for female
infertility.75 They assert that, "[t]o deny protection to surrogacy while
allowing it for AID [Artificial Insemination by Donor] would discriminate
against infertile women and would likely be found in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 76 In addition,
protecting the right of fertile couples to bear and beget children, while
denying infertile couples the same right, results in discrimination. Under
this reasoning, the practice of surrogacy is protected by the Constitution
and may only be restricted upon a demonstration of a compelling state
78
interest.
Opponents of surrogacy, on the other hand, argue the right of
procreative liberty, as established in the Griswold-Roe line of cases,
applies exclusively to "marital intimacy" and "social stability."" Thus,
non-coital means of reproduction are beyond the scope of constitutional

72See Kerian, supra note 22, at 121.
7'SeeKerian,supra note 22, at 121 (citing Ann MacLean Massie, RestrictingSurrogacyto
Married Couples:A ConstitutionalProblem? The MarriedParentRequirement in the Uniform
Status of Children ofAssisted Conception Act, 18 HASTGS CONST. L.Q. 487,505 (1991)).
74
See Kerian, supra note 22, at 122 (citing Massie, supra note 73, at 508).
75
See ScoTTB. RAETHEET ucSOFCOIERCIALSURROG,,TEMOTHERHOOD: BrtAVENEiW
FAMIFuS? 17 (1994). But see Barbara L. Keller, SurrogateMotherhood Contractsin Louisiana:
To Ban orto Regulate?,49 LA. L. REv. 143, 179 (1988) (distinguishing betvween sperm donation,
which involves virtually no risks and surrogate motherhood, which involves the physical and
psychological
risks of carrying a child for nine months).
76
See Kerian, supra note 22, at 122.
'See RAE, supra note 75, at 18.
73
See John A. Robertson, ProcreativeLibertyandthe State'sBurden ofProofinRegulating
NoncoitalReproduction,in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS, AD PI , iCY24,25-26 Larry
Gostin ed., 1990).
7'See Kerian, supra note 22, at 121.
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protection." They contend that "bringing a third party [the surrogate] into
the procreative relationship cannot be justified on a theory of marital
intimacy, and the strain such an arrangement puts upon the traditional
notions of parenthood and family does little to further social stability."8'
Furthermore, opponents argue that even if the right of the surrogate
mother and the biological father to reproduce is constitutionally protected,
the payment of fees to the surrogate does not enjoy constitutional
protection.82 According to this reasoning, "[t]he dangers of exploitation
and commodification inherent in commercial surrogacy, then, arguably
constitute countervailing interests that states may identify as outweighing
the right of privacy asserted by prospective surrogate parents." 33 Thus,
opponents of surrogacy argue the prohibition of surrogacy arrangements
' 84
is justified by a compelling state interest in preventing "child bartering.
While the right to procreate falls under the constitutional right to
privacy, the question of whether the Constitution protects the right to
procreate via surrogacy has remained largely unanswered, despite the
convincing arguments made on both sides. Moreover, complex issues
persist regarding the custody, care, and parentage of the child after birth."
In grappling with these issues, courts have encountered confusion in
determining
under what principles of law surrogacy cases should be
86
decided.
The Leading Surrogacy Cases
In the absence of statutory laws governing surrogacy, courts have
attempted to resolve surrogacy issues by analogizing them to issues
arising from artificial insemination or adoption. Accordingly, most of
the earlier judicial opinions regarding surrogacy were based on contract
and family law principles.88 At the same time, such opinions relied on the

"See Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions:A Breeding Groundfor Surrogacy, 65 N.C.

L. REV. 127,152 (1986) ("The fundamental right of privacy in childbearing matters is intended to
guarantee the right of an individual to control his or her own reproductive faculties, not to
commission and monitor the pregnancy of a third party.')

"See Keller, supra note 75, at 176.
"See Keller, supra note 75, at 177.
" O'Bien, supra note 80, at 147.
4
See Kerian, supra note 22, at 121.
85See Kerian, supra note 22, at 122.
86See Kerian, supra note 22, at 122.
"See Kerian, supra note 22, at 122-23.
"See Kerian, supra note 22, at 123.
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"best interests of the child" standards 9 The following discussion
examines the development of surrogacy law in the United States, placing
special emphasis on the two most influential and precedent-setting cases.
JN RE BAB Y M AND JOHNSON V. CAL VERT

The Early Cases
In the 1980s, state courts began to address the issue of surrogacy. In the
1983 case of Doe v. Kelley,9" a Michigan trial court struck dowm a
surrogacy-for-money arrangement on the grounds it violated state
adoption laws. 91 As previously noted, the court of appeals upheld the
statute as constitutional, and determined that while the decision to bear a
child is constitutionally protected, the exchange of money in connection
with the adoption of the child from the surrogate mother is not.'
Furthermore, the court viewed the surrogate parenting arrangement as an
effort to circumvent the Michigan adoption laws.9' Thus, the court
reasoned that, since the statute in question prohibited adoption for money,
it also prohibited payment for consent to adopt a child born out of a
surrogacy-for-money arrangement. 94
In SurrogateParentingAssociates v. Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong,9
the court addressed the legality of surrogate parenting under a Kentucky
statute that prohibiting the purchase or sale of a child. 6 In upholding the
validity of surrogacy contracts, the court held that surrogacy did not
constitute "baby selling" under the statute.97 The court determined that
unlike adoption, surrogacy contracts are arranged before conception, and
are, therefore, based on rational, well-reasoned decisions. 93 Furthermore,
the court reasoned that both the statute and surrogate parenting
arrangements yield similar results to the extent that "both enable a
childless couple to have a baby [which is] biologically related to one of
"See Kerian, supra note 22, at 123.
"'307NAV.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
9
'Id. at 441. The relevant statutory provision is IMCH. COM P. LAWS § 710.54 (1933).
92Id.

at 441.

9

3Id.
9
4Id. at 440-41.

'-704 SAV.2d 209 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
9Id. at210. SeeKY. REV. STAT. § 199.590(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Mcril 1991) (prohibitingthe

sale, purchase, or procurement of a child for adoption).
97SurrogateParentingAssoc., 704 SAV.2d at 211.
9
81d.
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them when they could not do so otherwise."99 Despite upholding the
legality of surrogate parenting arrangements, however, the court placed
limitations upon such arrangements by allowing the birth mother a period
of five days after the birth of the baby to change her mind."'
In contrast, the court inInreAdoption ofBaby Girl L.J.'0 ' addressed
the issue of surrogacy-for-money by employing a standard of looking at
the best interests of the child.102 In this case, the court held the best
interests of a child born out of a surrogacy arrangement would be served
by awarding adoption to the child's natural father. 103 The Baby Girl court
further addressed the issue ofwhether the surrogate parenting arrangement
violated New York adoption laws, prohibiting the sale of children. 0 4 The
court determined these statutes were enacted to prevent the auction of
children without consideration of their well-being. 10 5 It then concluded
such statutes 0 6 did not necessarily prohibit surrogate parenting
arrangements.
In re Baby M
Although courts had addressed the issue of surrogacy before, the case that
brought national attention to surrogacy was the 1988 case of In re Baby
M.' 0 7 This case involved a surrogacy contract between Mary Beth
Whitehead and William Stem in which Mrs. Whitehead agreed to be
artificially inseminated with Mr. Stem's sperm and to carry and deliver
the child that resulting from the procedure.'
The contract further
provided that Mrs. Whitehead was to be paid a fee of $10,000 upon
delivering the child to Mr. Stem and his wife.0 9 However, after the birth
of the child, Mrs. Whitehead refused to hand the baby girl over to the
Stems." 0 When the Stems, accompanied by police, went to reclaim the

99Id. at 212.
1
°°Id. at 213.
'0'505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
'02Id. at 815.
'031d. at 815.
'4MId.at 817.
'05 1d. at 815.
'06505 N.Y.S2d at 818.
'07InreBabyM, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.Div. 1987), affd in part and rev'd in
part,537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
'0'537 A.2d at 1235.
'09d.
"Od. at 1236-37.
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child after obtaining a court order for temporary custody, Mrs. Whitehead
passed the child through the window to her husband, and the Whiteheads
subsequently left the state with the child."' Florida police eventually
recovered the baby from the Whiteheads and returned her to the Sterns.2l
After the Stems recovered the baby, they brought suit for the
enforcement of the surrogacy contract and permanent custody of the
child." 3 The trial court held the contract was enforceable, Mrs.
Whitehead's parental rights should be terminated,
and permanent custody
4
of the child should be awarded to Mr. Stern."
In the trial court opinion, Judge Sorkow reasoned the constitutional
right to privacy and the Equal Protection Clause legitimized commercial
surrogacy.1 5 He stated "[f]amily and procreativeprivacy rights legitimate
both private use of commercial surrogates and public validation and
enforcement of surrogacy agreements;" he also noted "[t]he right to
procreate by whatever means available furthered the value and interests
underlying the creation of family."" 6 Judge Sorkow concluded under the
Equal Protection Clause, a woman should have the right to sell her
reproductive capacities just as a man has a right to sell his sperm." 7
The court likewise determined surrogate parenting arrangements did
not violate the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against human
slavery." 8 The court reasoned because the child resulting from a
surrogacy arrangement is biologically connected to the intended father, the
father "cannot purchase what is already his."" 9 Furthermore, state
adoption statutes relating to the termination ofparental rights, the consent
period after birth, and the prohibition on fees paid in connection with the
adoption of the child would not apply in this situation because the
legislature did not intend for them to apply to surrogacy. 2 "

..Id.at 1237.
"-537 A.2d 1227, 1237 (N.J. 1988).

"5525 A.2d 1128, 1164 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
1 61d.
17Id.

"'Id. at 1157. See M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, Mi
7at Money CannotBIT:
CommercialSurrogacy and the Doctrine ofIllegal Contracts, 32 ST. LOLIS U. L. 11171, 11S3
(1988).
""See Schejbal-Vossmeyer, supra note 118, at 1183.
'"CSee Schejbal-Vossmeyer, supranote 118, at 1184 (In contrast to the New Jerzey Supreme
Court, which applied family law principles, the trial court applied contract law in this case).
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey invalidated the
surrogacy contract between Mrs. Whitehead and the Stems on the grounds
it violated state adoption statutes and contravened public policy.12 The
court applied family law principles and concluded that the best interests
of the child would be served by awarding custody to Mr. Stem.122 In
recognizing Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights, however, the court voided
the adoption of the child by Mrs. Stem and remanded the case for an
appropriate determination of Mrs. Whitehead's visitation rights." 3
With respect to other issues, the court determined the $10,000 fee
paid to Mrs. Whitehead by the Stems was not for the personal services of
Mrs. Stem, but rather for the adoption of the child.'24 Since New Jersey
law prohibited the payment of money or other consideration in connection
with the adoption of a child, the court found that the surrogacy contract
was an effort to frustrate the goals of the adoption 2statutes
because the
5
parties knew that the money paid was for adoption.'
The court also found that pursuant to state law, courts may not
terminate parental rights unless a party can demonstrate voluntary
surrender, abandonment, or that the natural mother is unfit. 126 Because
none of these factors were present, the court held "a contractual
agreement to abandon one's parental rights, or not to contest a termination
action, will not be enforced in our courts."' 27
The court also addressed the public policy issue. Focusing on the
best interests of the child standard, the court held a contract in which
parents decided who would get custody of the child before the child's
birth was against the child's best interest.2 8 The court also implied such
contracts constitute a form of baby-selling, which results in the
"'1537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988) The court determined that surrogacy contracts

conflicted with statutory provisions prohibiting the payment of money in connection with
adoptions, requiring proof of paternal fitness and abandonment before termination of parental
rights, and making the surrender of custody and consent to adoption revocable in private

adoptions. Id.
1

'id. at 1259.
"31d. at 1263.
24
1d. at 1240.

"Id. The New Jersey statute prohibits the payment of money or consideration of any kind
(including discharge of financial obligations) in connection with adoption proceedings. Id. (citing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West 1988)). An individual found guilty of violating this statute is

guilty of a high misdemeanor. Id. at 1240-41.
'26537 A.2d at 1242.
'2 1d. at 1243.
"AId. at 1246.
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exploitation of all parties involved. 129 Under the court's rationale,
surrogacy contracts do not pass muster under the best interests of the child
standard because they fail to inquire into the "fitness of the [purchasing
couple] as custodial parents" and they fail to consider the effect on the
child of separation from its natural mother. 30
The court also considered the ramifications of the limited counseling
Mrs. Whitehead received pursuant to the surrogacy contract. The court
concluded surrogacy both fails to provide the natural mother with
necessary counseling and psychological evaluation and deprives the
intended parents of vital information about the surrogate's medical and
psychological history.' 3 ' Furthermore, even though Mrs. Whitehead had
undergone a psychological evaluation to determine whether she might
change her mind, the results of this evaluation were never discussed with
the Stems. 132 If the results of the evaluation had been disclosed both
parties would have known of the possibility that Mrs. Whitehead might
refuse to relinquish the child.'
The court further construed public policy to require children remain
with and be raised by both natural parents. 134 The court held surrogacy
contracts violated this policy because they provided for the permanent
separation of a child from its natural mother.135 Finally, the court rejected
the trial court's holding that the constitutional right to procreative liberty
and the Equal Protection Clause supported the legality of surrogacy
contracts. 36 Although the court recognized that the right to procreate was
constitutionally protected, the court held this right did not extend to
surrogacy because "the custody, care, companionship, and nurturing that
follow birth are not parts of the right to procreation... ,,1 The court
reasoned that the right ofprocreation, derived from the constitutional right
to privacy, is "qualified by the effect on innocent third persons of the
exercise ofthose rights."' 38 Thus, biological parents cannot use their right

'291d. at 1242.
130
1d. at 1248.
13537 A.2d at 1241.
"21d. at 1247.
"'Id.at 1247-48.
'34 d. at 1246-47.

1351d.

'537 A.2d at 1253-54.
'37Id. at 1253.
B'Id. at 1254.
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to procreate to justify an arrangement that would contravene the best
interests of the child.' 39
Addressing the trial court's equal protection argument, the court held
the use of donor sperm for artificial insemination could not be analogized
to a surrogate mother in determining equal protection. 4 ' The court
reasoned that, given the substantial differences in the time commitment
and the physical and psychological strain between carrying a child to term
and merely donating sperm, the two situations were41so diverse they could
not form a basis for an equal protection problem.'
In summary, the Baby M case serves to illustrate the harm that may
result from surrogate parenting arrangements. The court, however,
suggested that "legislative consideration of surrogacy would provide an
opportunity to consider the overall impact of new technology in
reproduction."' 142 As a result, a number of state legislatures enacted
statutes prohibiting surrogacy. 43 At the same time, courts following the
Baby Mrationale confronted the issue with extreme caution. 44 Then, in
1993, came the landmark decision of Johnson v. Calvert," 5 in which the
California Supreme Court became the first state
high court to legitimize
46
arrangements.1
surrogacy
the use of gestational
Johnson v. Calvert
In Johnson v. Calvert,147 the California Supreme Court held gestational
surrogacy contracts did not violate the United States Constitution, state
law, or public policy. 4 Like most surrogacy cases, Johnson involved a

139Id

1401d.

141537 A.2d at 1254-55.
142See Katy R. Klinke, The Baby M. Controversy:A ClassDistinction, 18 OKLA. CITY U.

L.REv.43113, 139 (1993) (citing Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1264).
1 See Kerian, supra note 22, at 128.

'44See,e.g., In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) (holding that
surrogacy contracts violated state statutory prohibitions against compensation in exchange for the
adoption of a child); Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (same). But
see In re Adoption of Baby A & Baby B, 877 P.2d 107 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that even

though the surrogacy arrangement provided for payment, the fee was not provided for locating a
child for adoption, and therefore did not contravene state adoption statutes).
'45851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
'46Id.
at 778.
1471d. at 776.
141d. at 778.
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married couple, Mark and Crispina Calvert, who desired to have a child. 49
Although Crispina Calvert was able to produce ova, she was unable to
bear a child since she had a hysterectomy several years earlier."" After
hearing about the Calvert's plight, Anna Johnson, a nurse and single
mother, approached the Calverts and offered to serve as a surrogate.' 5 '
Under the surrogacy contract, Ms. Johnson agreed to carry to term the
embryo resulting from the union of Mr. Calvert's sperm and Mrs.
Calvert's egg. 5 2 She would also relinquish all parental rights to the
Calverts upon the birth of the child. 5 3 In return, the Calverts agreed to
pay Ms. Johnson $10,000 for her services, as well as all medical and
related childbearing expenses. 54 All parties signed a formal contract
55
indicating their agreement to the aforementioned conditions.
Prior to the birth of the child, the relationship between Ms. Johnson
and the Calverts deteriorated.' 56 Accordingly, the Calverts sought a
judicial declaration that they were the legal parents of the child.157 Ms.
Johnson filed a similar action, and the two cases were eventually
consolidated by the court. 58 When Ms. Johnson gave birth to the child,
blood tests indicated that the child was biologically related to the Calverts,
and not to her. 59 Thus, the trial court held the Calverts were the child's
"genetic, biological, and natural parents" and the surrogacy contract was
legally enforceable.' 6 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision, and the California Supreme Court followed suit, holding the
Calverts were to be the child's parents at birth based on6their genetic
relation to the child and the original intent of the contract. 1
In deciding this case, the California Supreme Court was faced vith
two primary issues: (1) whether the child's 'natural mother' under state
law was the genetic mother or the birth mother, and (2) whether
149Id

S085 1 P.2d at 778.
51
115
1d.

2

Id.

153Id.
1S8 5 1 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993).
156Id.

'571d.

's5 Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 4 1991).
'Johnson,
851 P.2d at 778.
0

161d.
161Id
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gestational surrogacy arrangements contravener62 the constitutional
guarantees and public policies of the state statutes.'
Addressing the first issue, the court considered the Uniform
Parentage Act (Act), which defined the parent/child relationship as
including both "natural" and "adoptive" parents. 63 The court determined
that, because the Act was passed before the first reported commercial
motherhood arrangement, the legislature did not intend for the Act to
resolve surrogacy disputes.'64 However, the court concluded that the Act
"facially applies to any parentage determination,
including the rare case
165
issue.'
at
is
maternity
in which a child's
Accordingly, the court looked to the Act to determine the mother of
the child. 66 Relying upon Civil Code Section 7003, a parent/child
relationship between a child and a natural mother might be established by
proof of her having given birth to the child. 67 Although the Act
prescribed only one method of ascertaining the mother/child relationship,
the court determined later provisions of the Act, applicable to finding a
father/child relationship, might also apply in determining the existence of
the mother/child relationship. 68 Under California Civil Code Section
7004 and California Evidence Code Section 721, paternity might be
determined through a blood test. 69 Thus, under the various code
provisions, disputes as to maternity might also be resolved through blood
testing.170 Because both Crispina Calvert and Anna Johnson had presented
evidence, genetic evidence and bearing the child respectively, the court
was compelled to examine the
original intentions of the parties in entering
7'
contract.'
into the surrogacy

1621d.

at 777-78.

"'Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,778-85 (Cal. 1993). See also Uniform Parentage Act,
CAL. Crw. CODE§§ 7000-21 (West 1993) (repealed and replaced by §§ 7600-7650 in the California
Family Code, effective January 1, 1994).
'6Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779. The Uniform parentage Act was introduced in 1975 to
eliminate the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children. Id. at 778-79.
16"Id. at 779.
'"d.at 780 (referring to CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-21).
'6Id. (referring to CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(1)).
"Id. (referring to CAL. CIV. CODE § 7015).
6'Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,780-81 (Cal. 1993). See CAL. CIV. CODE §7004 (West
1993) and CAL. EVID. CODE § 892 (West 1993) (repealed and replaced by CAL. FANM. CODE §7611,
7611.5 and
7612 (West 1994) and CAL. FAM. CODE §7551, effective January 1, 1994).
170Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781.
17id.
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Mark and Crispina Calvert had agreed to supply the genetic material
to Anna Johnson so she could bear a child genetically related to them.'12
They had not intended to donate a zygote to Ms. Johnson so she could
have a child of her own. I'3 The court observed that but for the Calvert's
original intention to have a child, Ms. Johnson would not have received
the zygote in the first place. 74 Accordingly, the court held the intentions
of the parties were clearly defined by the surrogacy contract.
Although the Act recognized both genetic consanguinity and giving
birth as a means of establishing the mother and child relationship, when
the two means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to
procreate the child, that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a
child that she intended
to raise as her own, is the natural mother under
7
law.
California
Further, in addressing the public policy issue, the court rejected Ms.
Johnson's argument that surrogacy agreements contravene public policy
because, under the adoption statutes, payment for consent to the adoption
of a child is illegal.1 76 The court reasoned that gestational surrogacy was
77
so different from adoption that the state adoption statutes did not apply.
The court found the payments made pursuant to the surrogacy contract
were intended to compensate Ms. Johnson for carrying the child to term,
not for relinquishing her parental rights to the child. 173 Thus, the court
held the contract did not violate public policy on those grounds."
The Calverts also argued surrogacy contracts were legally
enforceable based on Senate Bill 937, a bill passed by the California
legislature in 1992. IS That legislation included a statement that surrogacy

'id. at 778, 782.
"'Id.at 787.

'74See, e.g., John L. Hill, What Does It Mean to be a "Parent?"The ClaimsofBiology as

the Basisfor ParentalRights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353,414-15 (1991).
"'7Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
1761d. at 783-83. Section 273(a) of the California Penal Code states: It is a micdemeanor
for any person or agency to pay, to offer to pay, or to receive money or anything of value for the
placement for adoption or for the consent to an adoption of a child. This subdivision shall not
apply to any fee paid for adoption services provided by the State Department of Social Services,
a licensed adoption agency, adoption services providers, as defined in Section 8502 of the Family
Code, or an attorney providing legal services. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 1998).
177Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784.
1781d.

179Id.
"lId,at 783.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

Vol. 2:557

contracts do not contravene sound public or social policy.' 81 However,
82
because Governor Pete Wilson vetoed the bill, it did not pass.
Ms. Johnson, in turn, pointed out a number of other public policy
violations, including involuntary servitude and the exploitation and
degradation of women.'
First, the court dismissed the involuntary
servitude claim on the grounds that Ms. Johnson had brought forth no
evidence of coercion or duress in the contract.' 84 Next, the court rejected
Ms. Johnson's claim that surrogacy contracts exploit women, especially
those from a lower economic class.8 5 Specifically, the court noted "there
has been no proof that surrogacy contracts exploit poor women to any
greater degree than economic necessity in general exploits them by
inducing them to accept lower-paid or otherwise undesirable
employment."' 8 6 In support of its position, the court cited the Office of
Technical Assessment Report on the demographics of surrogates, which
found that while a majority of surrogates came from the income bracket
of $15,000-$30,000 per year, only 13 percent of the overall number of
187
surrogates had incomes below $15,000 per year.
The court further determined that since Ms. Johnson was not the
child's natural mother under California law, any constitutional interests in
the child claimed by Ms. Johnson, including her rights to privacy,
procreative liberty, and substantive due process, were superceded by those
of Crispina Calvert, the biological mother.18 8 Accordingly, the court
dismissed Ms. Johnson's claims of constitutional and public policy
violations.189 Thus, it held the gestational surrogacy contract between Ms.
Johnson and the Calverts was legally enforceable and it did not run afoul

"'IId

'Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783.
...
Id.at 784-85.
"Id. at 784. It is interesting to note here that Ms. Johnson was the one who approached
the Calverts with the offer to become a surrogate mother for them. Id. at 778.
"'Id. at 785.
186Id.
"'See U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL

CHOICES 273-74 (1988).
"'SeeEric A. Gordon, Note andComment, The Aftermath ofJohnson v. Calvert:Surrogac,
Law Reflects a More Liberal View of Reproductive Technology, 6 ST.THOMAS L. REV. 191, 200
(1993).
18id.
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of the United States Constitution, state law, or social and public policy
interests.19
As the aforementioned case law clearly demonstrates, courts have
encountered great difficulty in resolving surrogacy-related custody
disputes. Although the issues surrounding such disputes have not been
completely resolved, this legal debate has engendered debate in a number
of other societal circles, debate that may shape the legal resolution of such
issues in the future.
THE FEMINIST DEBATE OVER SURROGACY
Although the issues surrounding surrogacy have been debated in anumber
of religious, economic, ethical, and moral contexts,' 9 1 perhaps the most
impassioned debates concerning the morality and legality of surrogacy
have occurred among feminists. Since the second wave of the feminist
movement in 1910, feminists have argued that women have a
constitutional right to control their own bodies, and therefore, have the
right to procreate, to use contraception, or to abort.' 92 With the advent of
new reproductive technologies, however, a number of different choices
have arisen. While some feminists view these new choices as
reproductive freedoms, others view them as vehicles for the exploitation
of women. Thus, feminists are widely divided on the issues surrounding
surrogacy.
The role of women in society historically has been defined by the
biological fact that only women can bear children.' 93 Since men have
exercised control over women's bodies and reproductive capacities, some
feminists fear that men will use surrogacy in order to further their control
over women's bodies for their own needs. 194 They also fear that the use
of the new reproductive technologies will infringe upon women's

.9 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993).

'9'For a discussion of (other) moral, ethical, and economic perspctives on surrogacy, C.!a
Kerian, note 22, at 150-58.
192See Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood. The Challenge for Fcminists, in
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 167, 168 {Larry Gostin ed,, 1990)
"See Norma J. Wikler, Socie4,s Response to the New Reporductive Tcchnoloigws The
FeministPerspectives,59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (1986).
"'4See GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECttNOLOGIES FRlOM
ARTIFCIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL VO.MBS,

283-88 (1985).
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autonomy and that women's reproductive capacities will be employed to
further the interests of a male-dominated society.195
Liberal feminists advocate a woman's reproductive choice and
freedom to contract.1 96 They opine that women should be free to choose
among the various reproductive alternatives, including surrogacy, as long
as this choice does not harm anyone in the process. 97
1 According to liberal
feminist theory, the protection of a woman's constitutional rights to
privacy and procreation is the foremost priority.'98 Therefore, liberal
feminists view surrogacy as a positive practice because it ensures the
preservation of these rights in such a way that all parties ultimately will
benefit. 9 9 The surrogate "achieves fulfillment by giving the gift of life to
the infertile couple and the couple also receives the benefit of a 'child of
their own."'"2 Furthermore, because both the surrogate and the intended
parents encounter great adversity to bring a child into the world, liberal
feminists reason that children born of surrogacy arrangements are the
actual beneficiaries of such arrangements.20 '
Radical feminists, on the other hand, argue that surrogacy exploits
both women and children.2 °2 In arguing that surrogacy commodifies the
reproductive capacity ofwomen, they analogize surrogacy to prostitution:
prostitutes sell their sexual services for a fee, while surrogates sell their
reproductive services for a fee.20 3 Under the radical feminist theory,
women do not exercise free choice in selling these services in the context
of either prostitution or surrogacy. 2 4 Rather, "a woman 'chooses' to do
this... only in the sense that when a woman's sole alternatives are being
poor or5 exploited, she may opt for exploitation as the lesser of two
20
evils.

9
sWikler, supra note 193, at 1044.
'96Rosemarie Tong, FeministPerspectivesand Gestational Motherhood: The Search for a
Unified Legal Focus, in REPRODUCTION, ETMiCS AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 55, 69
(Joan C.97Callahan ed., 1995).

1 d"

'"Id. at 69-71.
'9Id. at 68.

2

001d.

201

Tong, supra note
" Tong, supra note
203
2 Tong, supra note
04Tong, supra note
2
05Tong, supra note
2 2

196, at 68-69.
196, at 68.
196, at 64.
196, at 64.
196, at 65.
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Radical feminists also argue that surrogacy favors privileged women
at the expense of disadvantaged women because it is usually upper2
income women who hire lower-income women to bear their children."
As a result of this trend, radical feminists foresee the creation of a
dystopia such as that described in The Handmaid's Tale by Margaret
Atwood.0 7 The Handmaid'sTale portrays a society, Gilead, in which
abortion is criminalized and women are banned from the workforceZv In
this society, surrogacy became a form ofslavery.C 9 Women were divided
into the following categories: the "Wives" acted as the social secretaries;
the "Marthas" were the domestic servants; the "Jezebels' were the sexual
prostitutes; and the "Handmaids" werethereproductiveprostitutes. 2 ° The
final category of women, the Handmaids, were the only fertile women in
Gilead.211 They were utilized as "reproductive machines" for the wealthy
Commander and his infertile wife.212 Accordingly, when the Handmaids
became pregnant, the resulting child would be handed over to the
Commander and his wife and regarded as their child.213 One radical
feminist commentator, Janice Raymond, has argued that the gap created
by surrogacy arrangements betweenprivileged and disadvantaged women
parallels the fictitious situation portrayed in the Handmaid's Tale:
If women were truly lining up to become surrogate mothers out of
altruism and concern for the infertile, we would have middle- and
upper-class women bearing the babies of lower-class couples,
where the added gift of aiding those who cannot afford to pay
would be an even greater expression of altruism.2 4
Radical feminists further assert that surrogacy commodifies not only
women, but also children. They argue that surrogacy arrangements, which
consist of relinquishing a child for a sum of money, treats children born

2

T'ong, supra note 196, at 66.

2

"Tong, supra note 196, at 66.

20
1MARGARET

2"Tong
10
1d.
211

ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE 164 (1986).
supra note 196, at 66.

id.

212
Id.
213

ATWOOD, supra note 208, at 164.

2' 4

JANICEG.RAYMOND,VOMENAS WO.mS44-45 (1993). According to Raymond, altruism
is not the real motivation behind surrogacy and any "altruism" that does exist rduces womn's
bodies into raw materials used to serve the interests of others. Id. at 44.
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out of such arrangements as products that can be bought and sold on the
market.215 Since these children become products in a market that demands
product quality, "parents [sic] love for their children would no longer be
unconditional; rather it21would
depend on whether or not their children
6
products."
'good'
were
To further their argument that surrogacy arrangements are
psychologically damaging to children, radical feminists also assert that
carrying a child as a service for others in exchange for compensation
radically challenges the way in which society has viewed and valued
pregnancy. By attaching commercial values to the social and moral
meanings associated with human reproduction, surrogate parenting
fragments the inherent social and moral bonds of kinship. Therefore, the
children resulting from a surrogacy arrangement will be psychologically
disturbed to learn their mother gave them away pursuant to an
agreement.217
Given their divergent views on the morality and legality ofsurrogacy,
it should come as no surprise that feminist commentators do not agree on
the appropriate response to the aforementioned issues.
Some
commentators suggest that government regulation of female reproductive
decision making is necessary in order to protect the interests of women as
a group.218 Robin Rowland, a contemporary feminist writer, has stated
that:
to retain control over human experimentation, women may have to
consider state intervention of some kind in the areas of research
funding, research application and reproductive rights - with all its
inherent dangers .... We may have to call for an end to research
which would have helped infertile women to conceive, in
consideration of the danger to women as a social group of loss of
219
control over "natural" childbearing ....
On the other hand, other feminist writers, fearing the loss ofwomen's
reproductive choices, strongly oppose government intervention. One such
2

tSsee Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L.REv. 1849, 1930-32(1987).

2
"'ong,supra note
217

196, at 67.
Kerian, supra note 22, at 165.
2
'"Wikler, supranote 193, at 1050-5 1.
2

'ROBINROWLAND, MOTHERHOOD, PATRIARCHAL POWER, ALIENATION AND THE ISSUE OF
"CHOICE" IN SEX PROTECTION 14, 17 (1984).
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writer, Norma Wilder, argues that "[i]f one accepts that the government
would not be violating the fundamental right to privacy by intervening.
. it is difficult to argue that it would be a violation of that right for the
government to intervene in another reproductive practice, namely,
abortion."220
As the previous discussion illustrates, feminist views on the issues
surrounding surrogacy diverge considerably. While liberal feminists
argue that surrogacy allows infertile women to realize the gift of life,
radical feminists assert that surrogacy can lead to exploitation and
commodification of women and children. Although these differing
viewpoints illustrate the inherent dangers ofsurrogacy arrangements, they
also illustrate thepotential benefits of such arrangements. Thus, feminists
and other commentators, similar to the courts, have encountered difficulty
in achieving a consensus as to how surrogacy-related issues should be
resolved. Accordingly, the confusion over surrogacy in legal and feminist
circles, as well as other debates has necessitated legislative guidance on
these issues.
STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTORY
RESPONSES TO SURROGACY
State and federal legislators have faced similar difficulties when
addressing the issue of surrogacy. Often, the most difficult decision
legislators must make is whether and to what extent they should even
attempt to regulate the issue.
State Legislative Responses to Surrogacy
State legislatures have only recently begun to address the complex issues
raised by surrogacy. The results of state regulation of surrogacy vary
significantly from state to state: while some state statutes impose a
blanket prohibition on surrogacy agreements, others recognize them as
legally enforceable. One common factor, however, is that most state
statutes do not make the distinction between traditional surrogacy
arrangements and gestational surrogacy arrangements.?2

"'Wikler, supra note 193, at 1051.
"'SeeTodd M. Krim, BeyondBabyAf: InternationalPcrspcctiicson
GestattonalSurrogac
andthe Demise ofthe UnitaryBiologicalMother, 5 ANNALs HEALTH L. 193,210 (1996).
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Over the past ten years, almost half of the states have enacted
legislation addressing surrogacy.22 In Arizona, New York, North Dakota,

and Utah, the legislatures have taken a blanket approach, deeming all
surrogacy contracts to be void and unenforceable.223 Kentucky, Louisiana,
Nebraska, and Washington, on the other hand, have taken a less restrictive

approach, passing legislation that voids only those surrogacy contracts
that provide for compensation of the surrogate.224
Michigan has adopted the most hard-line approach by criminalizing
surrogacy.22 5 According to the relevant state statute, those who facilitate
surrogacy arrangements are guilty of a felony, punishable by a fine of up
to $50,000 and/or up to five years' imprisonment.226 In addition,
participants in such contracts are guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by
a fine of up to $10,000 and/or up to one year in prison.227

In contrast, Florida, New Hampshire, and Virginia have adopted the
minority approach to surrogacy contracts by making them legal and
enforceable.228 All three of these state statutes prohibit the compensation
of the surrogate, with an exception of expenses incurred as a result of
pregnancy and childbirth. 229 They also allow the surrogate an opportunity
to rescind the contract.230 Aside from these similarities, however, the
23
approaches of Florida, New Hampshire, and Virginia are each unique. '

22 2

ALA. CODE §§ 26-1OA-33 to 26-1OA-34 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1991

& Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-201 to 9-10-202 (Michie 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
742.14-742.17 (West 1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.950(20, 199.590(4), 199.990
(MichiefBobbs-Merrill 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 722.851 to 722.863 (West 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 126.045 (Supp. 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to 168-B:32 (1994 & Supp.
1995); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3-41,9:17-44 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§§ 121-124 (Consol. 1993 & Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07(1997); OR.
REV.STAT.ANN. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109.247 (1997); UTAH CODEANN. § 76-7-204 (1995); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 20-165 (Michie 1995 Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
26.26.210 to 26026.260 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-16 (1998).
"wSee Krim, supra note 221, at 210.
2"4See Krim, supra note 221, at 210.
2'5MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.857 to 722.863.
261d. at § 722.857.
'27 rd. at § 722.859.
"8See Krim, supra note 221, at 210.
'29See Krim, supra note 221, at 210.
"30See Krim, supra note 221, at 210.
" See Krim, supra note 221, at 210-11.
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The Florida statute includes several provisions specifically designed
to regulate surrogacy contracts. According to the statute, the following
factors must be present in any surrogacy arrangement:
(1) the intended parents, (who must be legally married) and the
surrogate are eighteen years of age or older; and
(2) a physician determines that
(a) the intended mother cannotphysically gestate a pregnancy
to term;
(b) the gestation will cause a risk to her health; or
(c) the gestation will cause a risk to the health of the fetus z
The statute further provides that the intended parents may
compensate the surrogate only for the reasonable living, legal, and
medical expenses in the prenatal, intrapartal, and postpartal periods.2 3
Finally, the statute allows the surrogate to rescind the agreement to
relinquish parental rights within seven days of the child's birth. 4
Surrogacy legislation in New Hampshire is even more
comprehensive than that in Florida because it requires judicial
preauthorization of all surrogacy contracts." Under the New Hampshire
statute, the following conditions must be present for a surrogacy contract
to obtain court approval:
(1) the parties must have given their informed consent;
(2) psychological counseling and evaluations must have been
completed;
(3) the contract must not include any prohibited or
unconscionable terms; and
(4) the contract must be in the best interests of the intended
child. 6
In addition, all court-approved surrogacy arrangements must provide a
right of recission to the surrogate until seventy-two hours after the birth

232FLA.STAT.

ANN. § 742.15 (VEsT 1996).

233Id.
234Id.

"2N.H.
REv.STAT. ANN.§§ 168-B:16 to 168-B:23 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
"Id.
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of the child.2 37 In the event that the surrogate decides to keep the child,
the parental rights of the intended parents are terminated, as is their
obligation to provide financial support to the child.238 If the surrogate
does not decide to keep the child, her parental rights will automatically
terminate and these same rights will vest in the intended parents.239
Finally, the New Hampshire statute prevents any entity from soliciting any
party for purposes of entering into a surrogacy arrangement for
compensation.240
The Virginia statute differs from the New Hampshire statute in that
it recognizes two general types of surrogacy arrangements, those that are
judicially pre-authorized and those that are not.24 ' Under the statute,
surrogacy contracts may be preauthorized if the gestational mother is
married and has had at least one successful pregnancy and if242
all parties,
including the surrogate's husband, have signed the contract.
Before court approval of the contract, a home study of the intended
parents, the surrogate, and the surrogate's husband must be conducted to
ensure that all parties meet the standards of fitness applicable to adoptive
parents.243 In addition, the Virginia statute requires all parties to undergo
physical testing and psychological counseling. 244 Finally, the intended
mother must be either infertile or unable to bear children without
substantial health risks to either herself or the unborn child, and at least
one of the intended parents must be biologically related to the unborn
child.245
With respect to surrogacy contracts executed without court approval,
the Virginia statute will enforce such contracts only if their provisions
may be reformulated to conform with statutory requirements.2 46 The
primary difference between court-approved contracts and court-reformed

27Id. at § 168-B:25.

281d.

"'Id.
2401N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:16.
24yKrm, supra note 221, at 212.
242VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(6) (Michie 1995). The intended child and the gestational
surrogate are entitled to legal counsel at this stage. Id.

2"Id. § 20-160(B)(8).
244Id
24
SId "

246See Alice Hofheimer, GestationalSurrogacy: UnsettlingParentageLaw andSurrogacy
Policy, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 571, 577-78 n.29 (1992).
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contracts is the surrogate's right to rescind the contract. 247 Pursuant to

court-approved contracts, the intended parents are automatically
considered to be the parents of the child unless the surrogate decides to
terminate the contract within 180 days of becoming pregnant 4 With
regard to surrogacy contracts that have not been court-approved, the
intended parents are not considered to be the parents of the child until the
surrogate, after atwenty-five daywaiting period, relinquishes herparental
rights by signing a consent form allowing the intended parents to be
named on the child's birth certificate.249
Like the New Hampshire statute, the Virginia statute also forbids any
entity from inducing or recruiting any party into entering a surrogacy
contract for compensation.250 This provision applies to
judicially
25
preauthorized and court-reformed surrogacy contracts alike. 1
Although some states have successfully attempted to resolve the
perplexing issues surrounding surrogacy, significant problems still remain
due to the lack of uniformity in state surrogacy legislation. This lack of
uniformity has created confusion because what may be considered "baby
bartering" in one state may be considered sound public policy in
another.2 2 Thus, problems of enforcement may arise when infertile
couples from states that prohibit surrogacy arrangements cross state lines
in order to enter into surrogacy arrangements in states where such
agreements are legally enforceable.
Attempts to Regulate Surrogacy at
the Federal Level
In the absence of comprehensive federal legislation relating to surrogacy
arrangements, diverse, and often conflicting, actions have been taken by
both state courts and legislatures in their attempt to resolve disputes
arising out of such agreements. Since 1989, there have been two
unsuccessful attempts at passing federal legislation that would prohibit or
restrict the use of surrogacy arrangements. The first bill, known as the
"Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1989," which was introduced by

24 7

1d.

24sKrim, supra note 221, at 212.
9Krirn,supra note 221, at 212.
2VA. CODE ANN. § 20-165 (Michie 1995).

2' id.
'32See Krim, supra note 221, at 213.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

Vol. 2:557

Representative Thomas A. Luken (D-Ohio),2 53 sought to impose criminal
sanctions upon anyperson who "on a commercial basis knowingly makes,
or engages in, or brokers a surrogacy arrangement. ' 254 Furthermore, the
Surrogacy Arrangements Act would have amended the Federal Trade
Commission Act to allow criminal sanctions for anyone who advertised
services related to surrogacy arrangements. 5 This bill eventually died in
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.256
The second bill, referred to as the "Anti-Surrogate Mother Act 2of57
1989," was introduced by Representative Robert K. Doman (R-Cal.).
This legislation purported to criminalize all activities relating to surrogacy
arrangements, including the provision of medical assistance and the
advertisement of services related to such arrangements. 258 Moreover, this
proposed bill sought to make all commercial and noncommercial
surrogacy arrangements null and void. 259 This bill met the same fate as its
predecessor when it died in the House Committee on the Judiciary. 60
The federal legislative vacuum with respect to surrogacy has
produced a patchwork of conflicting state regulations, creating serious
problems. In the absence of a uniform standard at the federal level, certain
states may become havens for couples who wish to have children through
surrogacy arrangements. In contrast, a uniform regulatory scheme would
allow all individuals an equal opportunity to produce children through
surrogacy arrangements.261 Such a scheme would also address many of
the concerns about surrogacy, such as the exploitation and
commodification of women, because concrete standards would ensure the
legitimacy of the practice.262

z"H.R.
275, 101st Cong. (1989).
4
25 Id.

2SSId.
2S6See Krim, supra note 221, at 214.
2s7 H.R. 576, 101 stCong. (1989).

28Id.

2591d.
260
See Krim, supra note 221, at 214.
26
'See Krim, supra note 221, at 214.
262
See Krim, supra note 221, at 214.
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THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE VITH SURROGACY
The United States is not alone in grappling with the complex issues
surrounding surrogacy. Canadian courts and legislators have encountered
a similar struggle in their attempt to regulate and interpret surrogacy
arrangements. Although the Canadian experience has no direct legal
effect on surrogacy in the United States, an examination ofthat experience
may provide valuable insights into how Congress should approach
surrogacy issues.
The Ontario Law Reform
Commission Approach
The Canadian experience with surrogacy began in 19S2, when the
Attorney General for Ontario asked the Ontario Law Reform Commission
(Ontario Commission) to inquire into and consider the legal issues relating
to the practice of human artificial insemination, including surrogate
mothering and transplantation of fertilized ova to a third party and to
report on the range of alternatives for resolution of any legal issues that
may be identified.6 3 In working toward this objective, the Ontario
Commission considered the experiences of264
other countries, including the
surrogacy.
of
issue
the
United States, with
The Ontario Commission's resulting report addressed a broad range
ofartificial reproductive technologies, including surrogate motherhood 65
Its proposal for the regulation of surrogacy arrangements is similar to that
adopted by the legislatures in Virginia2 and New Hampshire.! 7 In
particular, the proposal requires parties to a surrogacy arrangement to
follow certain prescribed practices, such as court approval of the
surrogacy contract and formal screening of both the surrogate and the
intended couple.26 ' Furthermore, under this proposal, the parental rights
ofthe surrogate mother would be automatically terminated, thus ensuring

20ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMiSSION, REPORT ON HUMAN ARTIICIAL REPIODUICTION
AND RELATED MNATTES 1 (1985) [hereinafter ONTARIO LAW REPORT].

'6See id. at 3-4.

2OSee id. at 7, 91-102, 218-73.
"'5See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia's regulation of
surrogacy).
2
67Seesupranotes 201-210 and accompanying text (discussingNewHampzhire's regulation
of surrogacy).
6
' sONTARIO LAW REPORT, supra note 263, at 235.
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the intended couple that they will be the legally recognized parents of the
child.269
A Call for Regulation,
Not Prohibition
The Ontario Commission formulated its proposal in favor of regulated
surrogacy based on its belief that "[regulation, not prohibition] would
protect the interests of all concerned, particularly the [interests of the]
child who is to be conceived and transferred" pursuant to the surrogacy
agreement. 22100 In reaching this conclusion, the Ontario Commission
carefully analyzed the arguments of the opponents of surrogacy, noting
that the opponents had cast "the burden ofjustifying the practice upon its
proponents, without advancing compelling arguments in favour of
prohibition."27 ' Attempting to shift this burden, the Commission argued
that "in principle, prohibitory action is warranted only where there is an
extremely powerful justification; the onus should be on those who would
advocate such action, not on those whose conduct is to be the subject of
legislative or other interference." 272
The Ontario Commission observed that most of the criticism of
surrogacy has focused on the fact that it is often done for profit.27 Thus,
it suggested that if the payment arrangements to both licensed commercial
agencies and surrogate mothers were controlled so that services might be
rendered for a modest profit, the rationale for these criticisms would be
significantly weakened. 274 The Commission noted that these criticisms
were further weakened by an empirical study suggesting that financial
gain may not be the sole motivating factor for a surrogate.275
Furthermore, the Commission reasoned that, given the relative
accessibility of artificial insemination, full-scale prohibition of surrogacy
2

6Id. at 260.

270
2 1Id.

at 232-33.
1d. at 232.
272
1d273
1d.

274

263, at 231.
See Phillip J. Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 117, 118 (1983). This study demonstrated that, even though money is a motivating
ONTARIO LAW REPORT, supra note
275

factor for surrogates, altruistic considerations are also significant. Surrogates in the study "often
expressed a strong wish to give the gift of a baby to a parent who needed a child." Id. at 118. For

"89% of the women who said a fee was a necessary condition, it was never a totally sufficient
reason for being a surrogate mother." Id.
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arrangements would result in clandestine private arrangements 76 This
would lead to a number of potential dangers, such as "exploitation of the
weak by the powerful, pregnancies contracted by the irresponsible, and the
introduction of infants into inappropriate, even dangerous, circumstances
.... ,,277 The Commission also argued that children born of these illegal
surrogacy arrangements might be in a worse position than under existing
law.278 If, for example, a dispute arose between the surrogate and the
intended parents as to the child's custody, the child's place in society
would be uncertain because there would be no available recourse to the
2 79

courts.

The Commission found unpersuasive the moral argument that
surrogate motherhood should be proscribed because one person should not
2 "' With respect to the
be exploited by another for purposes of childbirth.
morality of surrogacy, the Commission stated:
On a very trivial level, we see the principle [that one person should
not serve as a means to an end of another] ignored wherever
services are purchased and sold. A more relevant illustration of its
inapplicability occurs in the case of an organ donation for a
therapeutic purpose by a live donor. While the recipient is using
the donor to realize an "end," we do not find this conduct offensive
to fundamental values ....[W]e would suggest that the principle
that one person should not serve as a means to an end for another
is not an absolute one to which deference must be paid, but that
each situation should be evaluated independently to assess its
ethical propriety."
The Ontario Commission also found unpersuasive the argument that
surrogacy arrangements should be prohibited due to the physical risks
associated with pregnancy and childbirth.'
Although the Ontario
Commission recognized such risks, it reasoned that they would not be
problematic if they were carefully explained to a surrogate and minimized

"See Arthur Serratelli, SurrogateMotherhood Contracts Should the BritishorCanadian
Model271
Fillthe U.S. Legislative Vacuum?, 26 GEO.WASH.J. INT'L L.& ECo,,. 633,661-62(1993)
d.at 662.
278ONTARIO LAW REPORT, supra note 263, at 232.
279

1d.

2°'Id. at 231.
28tId.

7.Id"
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with adequate medical care. 283 Furthermore, since most surrogates have
given birth before, they are certain to be aware of the risks surrounding
pregnancy and childbirth.284 The Ontario Commission pointed out that
regulation modeled after the previously discussed Virginia statute, which
requires a surrogate to have given birth prior to entering into an
enforceable court-approved surrogacy arrangement, would ensure that
surrogate mothers were well-informed of the physical risks associated
with pregnancy and childbirth.285
In conclusion, the Ontario Commission emphasized that the
legalization of surrogacy arrangements would not lead to the dissolution
of the family nor harm to children.286 Rather, by assisting an otherwise
childless couple, surrogate motherhood may be the sole means of
affirming the centrality of family life.287 Thus, even though the
prohibition of surrogacy may properly animate individual moral values
and decisions, it was not warranted by the public interest.288
The Proposed Ontario Commission
Regulations
The proposed Ontario Commission regulatory scheme consists of three
major components:
(1) mandatory minimum standards established unambiguously
by statute to which all surrogacy arrangements must
conform;
(2) judicial intervention prior to the implementation of all
surrogacy arrangements particularly before artificial
conception technology is employed to achieve a pregnancy;
and
(3) recognition of the intended couple as the parents of the child
for all legal purposes, with the surrogate retaining no legal
relationship to the child.289
Under this proposal, the regulatory process begins when the
prospective surrogate and the infertile couple reach a written agreement
2831d "

2'See Serratelli, supra note 276, at 663.
23
sVA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(6) (Michie 1992).
286ONTARIO LAW REPORT, supra note 263, at 232.
287

1d"

usId.
2'9Id. at 233, 259, 260.
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that, at a minimum, addresses certain matters specified by statute.' For
instance, every surrogacy contract must require the surrogate to relinquish
the child immediately afterbirth.29' In the event that the surrogate refuses
to do so, the courts would be empowered to order the release of the
child.292 The Ontario Commission reasoned that such a requirement is
strongly supported by the equitable doctrine of specific performance as it
applies to contracts. 93
The Ontario Commission also addressed the issues of compensation
to surrogates and the possible birth of a handicapped child. 94 Regarding
surrogate compensation, the Commission recommended that no
compensation be allowed without prior judicial approval. 95 The
Commission reasoned that such a provision would reveal any possible
exploitation of the surrogate so that it might be prevented or remedied
prior to compensation. 296 Addressing the possibility that a child resulting
from a surrogacy arrangement would be born handicapped, the
Commission recommended that legislation provide that the intended
parents be deemed the legal parents of the child, regardless of the child's
condition at birth.29 7
Finally, the Commission proposed that the parties to a
surrogacy arrangement be required to agree upon a resolution
of the following issues:
(1) health and life insurance protection for the prospective
surrogate mother;
'"'Id.at 235.
29'Id. at 249, 252.
2'ONTARIO LAW REPORT, note 263, at 252. The Commission, however, addcd the
following exception: Where there has been a change in circumstances, or v.here new informtion
has become available, indicating that the approved social parents are unsuitable to receive the
child, the surrogate mother or the children's aid society should be permitted to apply, at any time
prior to the birth of the child, for a review of the approval of the surrogate motherhood azrCement.
The judge should be empowered to rescind the agreement. ONTARIO Lw REFO
O, supra note
263, at 253.
93

2 1d. at 250,
29Id. at 250.

252.

21Id. at 254,255. The Commission identified four components of payment: ( ) payment
to the surrogate in the wvay of profit for her participation; (2) payment of medical and Iegal
expenses; (3) payment for the surrogate's lost income during pregnancy; and (4) compl.=ntion for
pain and suffering, including postpartem depression. ONTA, OLAw REFORT, supranote 263, at
254.

'-"Id.at 255.

297Id
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(2) arrangements for the child should the intended father or
mother, or both, die before the birth of the child;
(3) arrangements for the child should the intended parents cease
to live together as a couple;
(4) circumstances regarding the particular manner in which
immediate surrender of the child to the parents is to be
effected;
(5) the right, if any, of the surrogate mother to obtain
information respecting, or to have contact with, the child
after surrender;
(6) prenatal restrictions upon the surrogate mother's activities
before and after conception, including dietary obligations;
(7) conditions under which prenatal screening of the child may
be justified or required, 23
for example, by ultrasound,
fetoscopy, or amniocentesis.
Similar to the aforementioned New Hampshire statute, the Ontario
Commission's proposed regulatory scheme requires the parties to seek
judicial approval of the surrogacy agreement prior to the artificial
conception procedure.299 At the approval hearing, the court would
evaluate the suitability of the parties to enter into the surrogate
motherhood arrangement.300 In evaluating the intended couple, the court
would first determine the extant medical indications of infertility and/or
health risks that would render pregnancy a risk to the couple."' The court
would also be required to consider all relevant factors, including the
marital status of the applicants, the stability of their union, and their
individual stability.30 2 After doing so, the reviewing court must be
satisfied that the intended child will be provided with an adequate
upbringing, which is a less rigorous standard than that applied to potential
adoptive parents.03
In assessing the potential surrogate, the court would consider factors
such as the physical and mental health of the surrogate, the disposition of
the surrogate's partner, and the effect that the surrogacy arrangement

291ONTARio LAw REPORT, supra note
329Id.

at 235.

00Id

301
3

id. at 236-37.

02Id. at 239.
303
Id

263, at 259.
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might have on the surrogate's existing children."

Based on a careful

consideration of all relevant factors, ifthe reviewing court determined that
the parties to the arrangement were suitable and that the agreement itself
conformed to5 specific legislative criteria, the court would approve the
30
agreement.
Immediately following the birth of the child, consistent with the
agreement, the surrogate mother will be required to surrender custody of
the child to the approved parents.306 The legal status of the child in its new
family will be confirmed by legislation and reflected in its birth
registration. 30 7 The surrogate mother, on the other hand, will have no legal
relationship to the child. 0 S Furthermore, the fact that the child was born
to a surrogate mother would not be reflected in the child's birth
registration.30 9
Finally, the Ontario Commission addressed the possibility that, aside
from hospitals and private infertility clinics that normally offer surrogacy
services, individuals might attempt to establish agencies on a commercial
basis.31 0 Accordingly, the Commission proposed that the Ministry of
Community and Social Services be required to regulate such agencies,
examining the credentials ofoperators ofagencies, the caliber and number
of their staff, advertisement and recruitment practices, services offered,
and fees charged.31
The Current Situation in Canada
The regulatory scheme at the provincial level proposed by the Ontario
Commission has never became law in Canada, nor has it significantly
influenced regulation at the federal level.
In fact, the Canadian
legislature contravened the Ontario Commission's proposal when it
enacted federal legislation prohibiting the practice of commercial
surrogacy.3 13 This legislation, commonly known as the New Reproductive

304

ONTARIO LAW REPORT, supra note

30SId. at 235.

263, at 239.

361d.
03
1Id. at 260.
3O91d "

31ONTARIO LAW REPORT, supra note
3'Id. at 262.
312Id.

"'id.

263, at 261.
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and Genetic Technologies Act (The Reproductive Act), bans thirteen
unacceptable uses of new reproductive technologies, including
commercial surrogacy. 14 It also prohibits the buying and selling of
human eggs and sperm, cloning of human embryos, and sex selection for
non-medical purposes.315 The New Reproductive Act constitutes the
Canadian federal
attempt to regulate Canada's market for new
reproductive technologies, which is quite large considering the fact that
316
about half a million Canadians suffer from infertility.
The Reproductive Act is based on the recommendations of the Royal
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Royal Commission),
which was appointed in 1989 by then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to
examine the medical, legal, and ethical issues arising from new
reproductive technologies. 1 7 In September of 1991, the Royal
Commission released a report summarizing the opinions of more than 550
Canadians who had spoken at seventeen public hearings concerning new
reproductive technologies.3" 8 This report demonstrated that many
Canadians believed that surrogate parenting is unethical.319 According to
the report, Canadians also thought that surrogacy has a potentially
negative effect on society and on the child and that surrogacy is likely to
foster exploitation of women. 320 Furthermore, minority groups were
concerned that commercial surrogacy would economically pressure
minority women into carrying a child for a wealthy couple. 31
Based upon this public opinion and its extensive study of the effects

of the new reproductive technologies, the Royal Commission released its
Final Report on November 30, 1993.322 The report, entitled ProceedWith
Care: The FinalReport of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive

3 14

1d.

3"Ronald Blassnig, CanadianLegislationto Restrict Use of13 Reproductive Technologies,
BUFF. NEWS,
3161d June 17, 1996, at A2.
"

3

8'See Serratelli, supra note 276, at 668.
31
See ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPORDUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, WHAT WE HEARD:
ISSUES AND QUESTIONS RAISED DURING THE PUBLIC HEARINGS 7 (1991) [hereinafter ROYAL
COMIISSION
INTERIM REPORT].
3191d. at 19.
320
1d.

3211d "

32'See ROYAL COMMISSION ONNEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, PROCEED WITH CARE:
THEFINALREPORTOFTHEROYALCOMMSSIONONNEWREPRODUCTIVETECHNOLOGIES 1 (1993)

[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
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Technologies, states "[p]reconception arrangements commodify
reproduction and children, they have potential to exploit women's
vulnerability because ofrace, poverty, orpowerlessness and leave women
open to coercion. '"3 Accordingly, the Report calls for the prohibition of
commercial surrogacy and advocates the imposition of criminal penalties
on those who act as intermediaries in the facilitation of commercial
surrogacy agreements.324 Moreover, the Final Report purports to establish
that a child's legal mother is the woman who gives birth to the child. 3
In the summer of 1996, the Canadian legislature adopted the Royal
Commission's recommended prohibition of commercial surrogacy
arrangements pursuant to the New Reproductive Act.326 Canadian Health
Minister David Dingwall said that the Act will "limit the use of new
reproductive technologies to protect the dignity and security of Canadians
and will establish a broad ethical context for conduct in this field." '27 The
penalty for violations ofthe Act, which include entering into a commercial
surrogacy arrangement, is a maximum $400,000 fine or ten years in
prison.328
Although it is too soon to determine the effect of the New
Reproductive Act on reproductive technology in Canada, an examination
of the Canadian experience leading up to the Act provides valuable
insights into two very different approaches to the regulation ofsurrogacy regulation and prohibition. Such insights may effectively guide the
United States in forming its own regulatory scheme.
PROPOSED RESOLUTION FOR
THE UNITED STATES
Because the current patchwork of state surrogacy laws has created
confusion overthe legality ofsurrogacy arrangements in the United States,
the time has come for a comprehensive federal policy to address the issues
surrounding surrogacy. Such legislation will protect both individual and
societal interests alike. Unlike many existing state laws, federal surrogacy

321Id. at 19.
3241d. at 14.
325id.
3 6See Blassnig, supra note 315, at A2.
3"'Id
3281d "
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legislation should not be aimed at prohibiting surrogacy, but at regulating
it. Along these lines, Congress would do well to pattern such legislation,
at least in part, after the state statutes enacted in Virginia329 and New
Hampshire, 330 and the regulation model proposed by the Ontario Law
Reform Commission.3 31 Such an approach would respect an individual's
right to procreate and, at the same time, would also promote the
government's interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens.
Furthermore, federal legislation regulating surrogacy would provide courts
with uniform, consistent guidelines for adjudicating surrogacy-related
disputes.
The Case Against Prohibition
If Congress decides to address this issue, it should not adopt a prohibitive
approach to surrogacy. Most ofthe proponents of this approach, including
some state legislatures,332 have emphasized the potential for physical and
psychological harm to the surrogate, the infertile couple, and the child. In
doing so, they have failed to recognize that surrogacy provides an ideal
reproductive alternative to many couples who suffer from infertility, an
alternative that provides these couples with the constitutionally protected
freedom of procreation and the joy and love that comes with parenthood.
Surrogacy "prohibitionists" also fail to acknowledge the "positive
motivations and experiences of surrogate mothers, who often express a
strong desire to give the gift of a baby to a parent who needs a child, or
who wish to satisfy personal needs of self-worth or a desire for
fulfillment." 333
As previously noted, surrogacy opponents argue that commercial
surrogacy is exploitative of women in that it serves as a form of
commodification of female reproductive capacities. However, this view
has the ironic effect of degrading women. American society recognizes
the right of the individual to contract freely and to make a living. The
denial of this right to potential surrogates dehumanizes women because it
implies that they are not capable of making intelligent, well-informed
329

See supra notes 241-251 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Virginia statute.
See supra notes 235-240 and accompanying text for a discussion of the New Hampshire

330

statute.331

'See supra notes 263-314 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ontario
Commission
proposal.
332
See supra notes 222-223 discussing state statutes that have prohibited surrogacy.
333
See Seratelli, supra note 276, at 670-71.
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decisions in exercising their right to contract. Specifically, it implies that
they need the legal protection of a male-dominated society in order to
avoid their own exploitation.334
Most, if not all, women who choose to be surrogates do so willingly
and voluntarily. Women are no more forced into becoming surrogates
than they are into any other commercial role in American society. To
argue that women, even lower-income women, enter into surrogacy
arrangements for lack of other opportunities, is to deny the intelligence,
talents, and competence of all women. Such an argument furthers the
dehumanizing view that it is intended to criticize: that women must use
their bodies in order to make a living. In order to ensure that women are
respected and celebrated in American society, women should have the
power to freely exercise their right to contract and to make a living as they
see fit. Specifically, women should have the freedom to voluntarily
contract for the use of their reproductive capacities by entering into
surrogacy arrangements. Furthermore, since men are allowed to freely
exercise their right to contract in selling their own reproductive capacities
by donating sperm, this view engenders an equal protection problem.335
If men are free to sell their reproductive capacities without government
intrusion, women should be free to do the same.
Opponents of surrogacy have also argued that surrogacy
arrangements effectively commodify children. They argue that this will
ultimately result in psychological harm to the child when the child learns
that he or she was "bought" from the woman who gave birth to him or
her.336 This argument, however, fails to recognize that, of all the parties
to a surrogacy arrangement, the resulting child is the true benefactor.
While all of the parties may arguably benefit from a surrogacy
arrangement, the surrogate mother must endure the physical and emotional
burdens of pregnancy while the intended parents must also endure a
number of emotional and financial burdens. Given the fact that both the
surrogate mother and the intended parents had such a strong desire to
bring this child into the world in the face of these burdens, the child, who
learns about how he or she was brought into the world, will likely gain a
sense of self-importance that few children born "naturally" will have.

"See, e.g., Kerian, supra note 22, at 139.
sSee supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
...
See supra notes 202-220 and accompanying text.
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To argue that surrogacy arrangements constitute a form of baby
selling is to ignore their true purpose: to bring a child into the world for
its intended parents to love and nurture. As one commentator has noted,
"[s]urrogacy creates ardently wanted life ....
The benefit of children
being born to parents who cherish them; the benefit of creating life that
would not otherwise exist . . . .
Under this rationale, surrogacy
arrangements also benefit surrogate mothers because they allow "women
who wish to become surrogates to reap both economic and altruistic
rewards for bestowing one of life's greatest gifts."338 Arguably, most
women who decide to become surrogates do so not only for financial gain,
but also for altruistic reasons. If these women sought purely financial
gain, surely they would choose a quicker, less painful means of achieving
this end.
The final argument against prohibiting surrogacy is that individuals
will continue to enter into surrogacy arrangements whether they are
legitimized or not. Because surrogacy provides such an attractive
reproductive alternative to infertile couples, surrogacy practices will
continue to be unregulated. In the absence of legal safeguards, surrogacy
agreements that are in fact exploitative will simply fall through the cracks.
Furthermore, there would be no assurance that proper medical, legal, and
counseling services would be available to potential surrogates and infertile
couples because professionals in these areas would be prevented from
339
rendering help in furtherance of illegal surrogacy arrangements.
Finally, ifsurrogacy arrangements were not legally recognized, the parties
would have no legal recourse should a dispute arise concerning the
340
custody or parentage of a child born out of such an arrangement.
Although the aforementioned concerns about surrogacy are
legitimate, they do not justify the prohibition of surrogacy arrangements.
Rather, these concerns may be adequately addressed through a
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme that maximizes the benefits of
surrogacy while minimizing the potential risks.

" 7Peter H. Schuck, The Social Utility ofSurrogacy, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 132, 135-

36 (1990).
8

3 1d. at 136.
339See Seratelli, supra note 276, at 672.
"°See Seratelli, supra note 276, at 672.
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A Proposed Regulatory Scheme
Federal surrogacy legislation, like the proposed Ontario Commission
regulations, should allow parties, with the assistance of counsel, the
opportunity to reach a written agreement that satisfies their needs and
objectives under the auspices of clear, well-defined guidelines. As in the
Ontario Commission regulations, the parties should be required to
consider and agree upon a resolution of health insurance protection for the
prospective surrogate; arrangements for the child should a divorce or
death occur as between the intended parents; arrangements for the child
should the child be born handicapped; arrangements for the release of the
child upon birth; prenatal restrictions upon the surrogate mother's
activities; and arrangements for the payment of the surrogate mother's
medical and legal expenses. 41
Furthermore, the agreement must expressly require the surrogate
mother to surrender the child immediately after the child's birth.
Accordingly, the name of the intended parents should appear on the
child's birth certificate, recognizing them as the parents of the child for all
legal purposes, regardless of the child's physical condition at birth. 4
This requirement, however, should only be enforced in gestational
surrogacy arrangements, in which the surrogate carries to term a child that
is biologically related to the intended parents. In this context, the
distinction between gestational and traditional surrogacy arrangements, in
which the surrogate carries to term a child that is biologically related to
her, is necessary because a gestational surrogate should be afforded no
legal right to a child that is the true biological child of the intended couple.
In traditional surrogacy arrangements, on the other hand, the
surrogate should be permitted to decide whether or not she wishes to keep
the child for a certain number of days after the birth of the child. As in the
New Hampshire statute, if the surrogate decides to keep the child, the
parental rights of the intended parents would terminate and they would no
longer be required to provide financial support to the child. If,however,
the surrogate decides to surrender the child, she automatically relinquishes
her parental rights to the child, and these rights would then vest in the

341

See supra note 254 and accompanying text.

"2As provided by the proposed Ontario Commission regulations, the intended parents
should be required to accept parental rights over the child even if the child is not bom '"'prfeeL"
See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
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intended parents.34 3 The right of rescission is only fair in a traditional
surrogacy arrangement because, unlike the gestational surrogacy situation,
the surrogate mother is in fact the biological mother of the resulting child,
and her rights as such should be recognized. Moreover, this requirement
provides the traditional surrogate the opportunity to make a voluntary
decision about whether or not to give up a child that is biologically her
own, thus reducing the appearance of coercion. In this sense, the
regulations proposed here mirror the Virginia and New Hampshire
surrogacy statutes. Unlike these statutes, however, the right of recission
exists only in gestational surrogacy arrangements.
Similar to the New Hampshire statute and the proposed Ontario
Commission regulations, the parties also should be required to seek
judicial preauthorization before the artificial conception procedure may
legally begin. As one commentator has noted, "[r]equiring the parties to
seek judicial preapproval will impress upon them the seriousness of the
surrogacy agreement and will provide a forum in which the contract can
be discussed in detail." 344 In order to obtain judicial approval, the court
must find that:
(1) the parties gave their informed consent to the agreement;
(2) physical and psychological examinations have been
completed;
(3) the agreement does not contain any illegal or unconscionable
terms;
(4) no evidence of exploitation or coercion exists in the
agreement; and
(5) that the agreement is in the best interests of the intended
child.
In examining these criteria, the court must review with special care the
results from the physical and psychological examinations of the parties.
First, the court must determine that the intended mother is either infertile
or unable to bear children without substantial health risks. Second, the
court must determine that there are no physical health risks that would
harm the surrogate mother or the potential child. Third, the court must
determine that all parties have the capacity to perform their obligations

343See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
344See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
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under the contract without any psychological ramifications. Finally, the
results from the physical and psychological testing of both the surrogate
and the intended parents should be disclosed to all parties so that, even if
the court is satisfied, that all necessary criteria are met, the parties may
refuse to enter into the contract if they are not satisfied with the results.
Nevertheless, if and only ifthe court determines that all parties are willing
and able to enter into the contract and that all other
legislative criteria are
345
contract.
the
approve
court
satisfied will the
Ideally, the prospective surrogate should have had a successful
pregnancyprior to entering into the surrogacy arrangement. As discussed
earlier, this requirement would ensure that the surrogate is aware of the
physical and psychological ramifications of pregnancy and her own
individual response to them. Although the Virginia statute's requirement
that the surrogate be married may ensure that the surrogate is part of a
stable environment, such a requirement may have the effect of attaching
a negative social stigma to out-of-wedlock pregnancies.6 Furthermore,
such a requirement is not essential to a successful surrogacy arrangement.
Therefore, it should not be legally enforced.
In order to reduce the "commercialization" of surrogacy
arrangements, the Virginia and New Hampshire statutes prohibit the use
of third party brokers and payment of a fee that exceeds the surrogate
mother's actual costs in carrying and delivering the child. 7 Likewise,
Congress should forbid the use of third-party brokers in order to maintain
the intimacy of the parties' decision to produce a child through a
surrogacy arrangement. By removing the influence of third parties,
intended parents and surrogate mothers can mutually evaluate each other
on a first hand basis, rather than engage in an impersonal, mediated
transaction. 348

3

sln theBabyMcase,the court expressed concern over the surrogacy arrangement because
it did not provide the natural mother vith the necessary counseling and psychological evaluation,
and it failed to "inquire into the fitness of the [purchasing couple] as custodial parents." In re
Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241, 1248 (N.J. 1988). The regulations proposed in this Comment
would effectively remedy these concerns.
45
See Elizabeth Seale Cateforis, SurrogateMotherhood:An Argumentfor Rcgulation and
a BlueprintforLegislation in Kansas,4 KAN. . L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 109 (1995).
347
See VA. CODEANN. §§ 20-162(A), 20-165; N.H.REV.STAT.AN,'. §§ 163-B, I6(IV), 168-

B:25(V) (1998).
-"See Cateforis, supra note 346, at 110.
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Unlike the Virginia and New Hampshire statutes, however, federal
surrogacy legislation should not prohibit the compensation of surrogates
beyond their actual expenses. Allowing payment to a surrogate effectively
recognizes the time and effort spent by the surrogate on behalf of the
intended parents. Furthermore, it respects the surrogate's freedom to
contract for her services. Many surrogates are prompted in part by
economic reasons. Thus, as one commentator has noted, "[p]rohibiting a
fee will unnecessarily restrict the practice and will perpetuate the cycle of
non-payment for 'women's work.' ' 34 9 As suggested by the proposed
Ontario Commission regulations, surrogate compensation, including
by the
compensation for profit, should be carefully reviewed and approved
350
court prior to implementation of the surrogacy arrangement.
The proposed legislation should also require tender of the promised
fee even if the surrogate miscarries in a certain month or if the child is
stillborn. Regardless of whether she gives birth to a perfect baby, a
surrogate mother has tendered her services, and payment for such services
under these circumstances would not be unwarranted.
Finally, challenges brought by surrogate mothers after the birth of the
child in gestational surrogacy arrangements and after the relinquishment
of parental rights in traditional surrogacy arrangements, should not be
cognizable unless equitable grounds, such as coercion or duress, exist to
provide a basis forjudicial relief. Since the court will likely have detected
these problems before approving surrogacy arrangements, these instances
would be rare. Should these problems arise after the birth of the child,
however, the court should evaluate the claim according to the best
interests of the child standard, which is the same standard employed in
most other custody disputes.351
CONCLUSION
The inconsistent precedent arising from surrogacy case law illustrates the
judiciary's need for uniform legislative guidance in adjudicating
surrogacy-related disputes. Such guidance should come in the form of the
regulation, not prohibition of surrogacy arrangements. Although the
arguments for prohibition raise valid concerns with respect to the legality
349Id

35"See supra notes 255-261 and accompanying text.
3'See Cateforis, supra note 346, at 110.
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and fairness ofsurrogacy arrangements, such concerns maybe adequately
addressed by the regulations proposed in this Comment. If implemented,
these regulations would protect the procreative rights of infertile couples,
protect surrogates and resulting children from exploitation and other
potential ill effects of surrogacy arrangements, and also respect the
contract rights of women who wish to act as surrogates. Under these
circumstances, surrogacy may ultimately be viewed as a positive
reproductive alternative that has the potential to benefit all parties
involved.
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